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JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON PAROCHIALISM
IN MUNICIPAL LAND USE DECISIONS:
SCOTT v. CITY OF INDIAN WELLS
An inevitable by-product of the growth of industrialization and
population in the twentieth century has been increasing population
and housing density in habitated areas.' This greater density has
created a situation in which land use decisions that concern one parcel
of land frequently affect neighboring property.2  These land use deci-
sions often affect neighboring landowners adversely, particularly when
the decisions permit further development of the land.' Thus, when a
1. The population density in the United States has increased approximately 65%
from near the inception of zoning in 1920 to the present. There were 35.6 persons
per square mile in the United States by 1920. That number had grown to 58.2 per
square mile by 1970. F. Pollara, Trends in United States Population, THE AMEI-
CAN POPU ATION DEBATE 58 (D. Callahan ed. 1971). This increase in average den-
sity merely reflects an increase in population. The actual density in urban-suburban
complexes is far greater; for example, in California more than 85% of the population
lives on only 2% of the land. CALIFoRNIA DEP'T OF FiNANcE, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL
ABsmAcT, VII, 2 (1969). Accordingly, the actual density is very high. For example,
there is approximately one acre of land per person in the eight counties surrounding
the San Francisco bay area, but only one-third of this land is useable for habitation.
The actual urbanized density is 12.8 persons per acre (8,129 persons per square mile).
W. ALONSO & C. McGumE, NEw COMMUNImES IN THE BAY AREA 11-12 (1971).
2. "Surely it is naive ...to think the consequences of one property user's ac-
tivities are confined to his property. Property does not exist in isolation. Particular
parcels are tied to one another in complex ways, and property is more accurately de-
scribed as being inextricably part of a network of relationships which is neither limited
to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which the legal system is ac-
customed to dealing. Frequently, the use of any given parcel of property is at the
same time effectively a use of, or a demand upon, property beyond the border of the
user." Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971).
3. More affirmative, demonstrable harms seem to be associated with land use
decisions which permit development than with decisions which prohibit further develop-
ment. It is submitted that land use development may result in six major types of ad-
verse effects on neighboring property owners. Two of these effects fall solely on resi-
dents of the municipality making the decision: (1) The strain which increased pop.
ulation puts on municipal services such as schools, recreational facilities, police and
fire protection and health related services like water and sewage facilities; (2) In-
creased property taxes caused by the new residents utilizing more municipal services
then they provide for in additional revenue. However, the following four adverse ef-
fects fall upon residents and nonresidents alike: (1) Reduced property values; (2) In-
creased traffic congestion near the area of development, initially caused by the con-
struction and thereafter caused by the new patrons, employees or inhabitants of the
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land use decision concerns property near a political border, the munici-
pality's4 self-interest often results in casting those adverse effects upon
nonresidents. The frequency of this occurrence has been multiplied
by the great number of governmental units making these land use de-
cisions and the physical proximity of these municipalities to one an-
other.5 In the aggregate, this kind of parochial 6 municipal decision-
making constitutes a serious land use problem.
One example of this problem recently occurred in Southern Cali-
fornia. There, a municipality permitted a development near its border
which many nonresidents believed affected them adversely. The non-
development; (3) A detrimental "change in character" of the area or community, par-
ticularly where the size, shape or architectural style of the structure conflicts with other
existing structures, thus making the development aesthetically objectionable; (4) Var-
ious forms of pollution including air or water pollution, visual blight or interference
with a view, excessive noise and/or noxious odors. The existence and extent of these
harms, of course, is dependent on the particular physical setting in which the develop-
ment is permitted and on the nature and magnitude of the development, regardless of
whether it is residential, commercial or industrial.
4. "Municipality" is used in this note to designate the local governmental body
making land use decisions. The term "municipality" technically includes cities, villages
and towns, but does not include counties which are subdivisions of the state rather
than municipal corporations. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW § 33 (1971) [hereinafter cited as D. HAGMAN]. For the purposes of this
note however, the term "municipality" will embrace both municipal corporations and
counties. A far greater number of municipalities than counties exercise zoning power.
In 1968, 6880 municipalities (out of more than 18,000) exercised zoning power. Only
711 counties (out of more than 3,000) engaged in zoning. M. CLAWSON, SU3URBAN
LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 98 (1971); D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING
AND CONTROL OF URBAN & LAND DEVELOPMENT, CASES AND MATERIALS 234 (1973).
5. In California there are two primary examples of this institutional fragmenta-
tion in the land use decision-making process. In the San Francisco bay area there
are nine counties and 92 cities making land use decisions. CALIFORNIA TOMORROW, DE-
MOCRACY IN THE SPACE AGE 15 (1973). In southern California there are 164 separate
incorporated cities in the eight counties surrounding Los Angeles. "Most of [these
municipalities] are small; created to meet pressing and immediate needs. Nearly all are
inadequately financed to meet the regional prssures that are now bearing upon them.
The political structure of each of these cities is of a separate design, carefully
dividing each community from its neighbors. The result of this fragmented structure
has been a narrow, myopic view of local problems. None has seen the regional needs
of an area which is fast becoming a megalopolis." Statement by Don Reining, execu-
tive secretary, Southern California Rock Products Ass'n, Oct. 13, 1969, Hearings on
Preparation and Adoption of the Open Space Element Before the California Joint Leg-
islative Comm. on Open Space Lands 130 (1972).
6. "Parochialism" is commonly used to describe the implementation of the selfish
priorities of municipalities when making land use decisions. See generally Feiler,
Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 655 (1971). This term should be contrasted with the term "fragmentation"
which is commonly employed in referring to a situation in which land use decisions
are being made by a large number of independent governmental units. See generally
Vestal, Government Fragmentation in Urban Areas, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 155 (1971).
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residents opposed the development in the California courts, and ulti-
mately the California Supreme Court confronted the problem in Scott
v. City of Indian Wells. 7 Acting resolutely against the city's parochial
approach, the court significantly expanded the protection afforded non-
residents adversely affected by land use decisions. The Scott decision
expanded this protection in three ways. First, nonresidents were given
standing to challenge adverse land use decisions in court.8 Second,
the right to notice and a prior hearing was extended to nonresidents
when such decisions affect their property. Finally, Scott imposed upon
municipalities the correlative duty to consider the effect of a land use
decision upon all neighboring property. The significance of this de-
cision is enhanced by the court's broad approach to what was a narrow
problem and by the fact that the court cloaked the novelty of the deci-
sion by deceptively intimating that it accorded with prior land use de-
cisions.
This note will analyze these three complementary elements of the
Scott holding and will discuss the potentially wide-ranging impact of
Scott on land use decisions in California.
The Factual Setting in Scott
The controversy from which Scott arose began when the city of
Indian Wells issued a conditional use permit9 which would have al-
lowed the construction of a major development on land just within the
city limits. The development would have consisted of golf and tennis
facilities, 675 condominium units, a seven-story apartment building and
a heliport.10 Since the development was designed to be compatible
with a neighboring country club in Indian Wells, the taller buildings
and commercial shops would have been located behind a hill, thus
making them invisible to members of the adjacent country club.'1
However, these buildings would have directly blocked the view of Al-
bert Scott and his neighbors. Scott's property adjoined the proposed
construction site, but it was located just outside the city limits.12 Be-
cause Indian Wells gave notice of pending permit hearings only to its
7. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
8. "Standing" refers to the permission granted parties to appear in court. The
right to a "hearing" refers to permission granted individuals to appear before an admin-
istrative body.
9. A conditional use permit grants administrative permission for uses not nor-
mally allowed by the zoning ordinances in the district. These conditionally permitted
uses are usually, but not always, listed in the ordinance. D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON,
& C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE, § 7.64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE].
10. 6 Cal. 3d at 544, 492 P.2d at 1138, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
11. Id. at 545, 492 P.2d at 1138-39, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746-47.
12. Id.
residents, the notice received by Scott was sent erroneously; none of
his neighbors received a similar notice.' 3 Mr. Scott spearheaded oppo-
sition to the project; he appeared at both the planning commission and
city council meetings and registered protests on behalf of himself and
fortfy-five other neighboring nonresidents. 4 Scott argued that the city
should consider the well-being of nonresidents as well as of the mem-
bers of the country club. Further, he contended that neighboring
nonresidents should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the city approved the development.' 5 The city ignored both
of these protests, thus prompting Scott to file suit in the Riverside
County Superior Court.
After the trial court sustained the defendant city's demurrer to
Scott's complaint, the district court of appeals affirmed the demur-
rer.16 On appeal, the California Supreme Court considered legal ques-
tions not previously settled in California:
[T]he City of Indian Wells owes adjoining landowners who are
not city residents a duty of notice to the extent given similarly
situated city residents, a duty to hear their views, and a duty
to consider the proposed development with respect to its effect on
all neighboring property owners. . . . [A]djoining landowners who
are not city residents may enforce these duties by appropriate
legal proceedings and have standing to challenge zoning decisions
of the city which affect their property.
17
Nonresidents' Standing to Challange A Land Use Decision
Scott held that nonresidents have standing to challenge zoning
decisions which affect their property. 8 This aspect of the decision
was based upon allegedly persuasive authority from other juris-
dictions.' 9 It will be seen, however, that the court employed this
13. Id. at 544, 492 P.2d at 1138, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
14. Id. at 544-45, 492 P.2d at 1138-39, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746-47.
15. Id. at 545, 492 P.2d at 1139, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
16. Id. at 546, 492 P.2d at 1139, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
17. Id. at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
18. Id.
19. The supreme court appears to have confused the issues of standing and of
a right to a hearing by an administrative body. The only case the court cited on the
standing issue granted a hearing but did not grant standing. Borough of Cresskill v.
Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). The court cited four cases
that appeared to deal with the right to a hearing. 6 Cal. 3d at 547-48, 492 P.2d 1140-
41, 99 Cal. Rptr. 748-49, citing Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d
113 (1962); Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d 96 (1963); Hamelin
v. Zoning Board, 19 Conn. Sup. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955); Schwartz v. Congregation
Powolei Zeduck, 8 Ill. App. 2d 438, 131 N.E.2d 785 (1956). Koppel, however, dealt
with both issues of standing and right to a hearing. Roosevelt and Hamelin considered
only standing, whereas Schwartz dealt with neither issue. This note will assume that
the court meant to cite the cases for the appropriate issues because there is some ambi-
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authority so selectively as to be misleading. The court selectively
cited cases supporting its decision without mentioning contrary au-
thority,20 and it deceptively21 attributed persuasive value both to deci-
sions based primarily upon statutory construction2 2 and to dicta.3
Moreover, the discussion of nonresident standing was deceptive be-
cause it concealed the decision's innovative character by intimating
that most other jurisdictions have taken equally progressive positions
in extending standing to nonresidents.24
Prior to Scott, seven other states had considered the question of non-
residents' standing to challenge an adverse zoning ordinance. Four of
these states have afforded standing to nonresidents and thus seem to
comport with Scott.25  Two state courts have held contrary to Scott,
26
and one state court has rendered clearly contradictory decisions on this
issue.27
Prior Authority on the Standing Issue
The case denoted by the California Supreme Court28 as the lead-
ing case on nonresident standing is Borough of Cresskill v. Borough
of Dumont.209 In that 1954 New Jersey case, the court voided a zoning
change from residential to commercial where the land which sur-
rounded it had previously been zoned by another community for resi-
guity as to which cases were intended to serve as authority for which issues. But cf.
Note, Notice Requirements to Parties Outside of City's Zoning, in The Supreme Court
of California 1971-1972, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 597 (1973), where the writer assumes
that the cases cited by Scott did concern the hearing issue. Id. at 599.
20. See notes 46-51 and accompanying text infra.
21. It is, of course, impossible to discern the intent behind the approach taken
by the court in Scott. Use of the term "deceptive" is not meant to impute to the
court an intent to delude. "Deceptive applies almost exclusively to surface appearance"
and does not necessarily imply deliberate misrepresentation. Tim A~mUCAN HE=RAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 342, 839 (1971). While this note maintains
that the Scott court employed authority in a manner which would mislead the casual
reader, it does not pretend to comprehend the court's true intentions.
22. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
24. See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
25. The four states are New Jersey, Connecticut, Kansas and Illinois. For a dis-
cussion of New Jersey, see notes 35-36 infra; for a discussion of Kansas, see note
39 infra; for a discussion of Connecticut, see note 38 infra; for a discussion of Illinois,
see note 40 infra.
26. The two states are New York and Maryland. For a discussion of New York,
see note 46 infra. The principal Maryland case is City of Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237
Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694 (1965).
27. See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra for discussion of conflicting Colo-
rado cases.
28. 6 Cal. 3d at 547, 492 P.2d at 1140, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
29. 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (1953), affd, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441
(1954).
dential uses. The change to commercial zoning was challenged both
by residents of the municipality which was proposing the zoning change
as well as by the adjacent municipality and nonresident neighbors."
The lower New Jersey court struck down the zoning change on a
number of grounds,3 1 and the supreme court affirmed on two grounds:
the change constituted spot zoning 32 and was not in accord with the
comprehensive plan of the borough. 33  While the court strongly de-
nounced the municipality's failure to consider the impact of the zoning
change on neighboring nonresidents,3 4 that denunciation must be con-
sidered dictum with regard to the issue of nonresident standing, since
the court expressly reserved any discussion of that issue."
Later New Jersey cases have allowed nonresidential standing to sue,
citing Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont.6
Cases Permitting Standing On Statutory Grounds
Cases from three other states have granted standing to nonresi-
dents.37 In each of these state, however, there is a specific statute
30. 15 N.J. at 240, 104 A.2d at 442.
31. The rezoning was struck down for being "spot zoning," for failing to promote
the public welfare, for failing to be in accord with the comprehensive plan of the bor-
ough in which it was situated, for constituting a public and private nuisance, and for
failing to consider the character of the region properly. 28 N.J. Super. at 32, 42-44,
100 A.2d at 185-86, 191-92.
32. A spot zone results when a small parcel of land is subjected to more or less
restrictive zoning than surrounding properties. CALIFORNA ZONING PRACTICE, supra
note 9, at §5.33.
33. 15 N.J. at 251, 104 A.2d at 448.
34. Id. at 244, 104 A.2d at 444.
35. The California Supreme Court apparently realized this reservation because it
did not state that the language quoted was a holding, whereas they did identify the
quotation from the lower court as a holding. 6 Cal. 3d at 547, 492 P.2d at 1140, 99
Cal. Rptr. at 748.
36. Borough of Roselle Park v. Township of Union, 113 N.J. Super. 87, 92-95,
272 A.2d 762, 764-66 (1970); Pscitelli v. Township Committee of the Township of
Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super. 589, 594, 248 A.2d 274, 276 (1968); The former
case thoroughly discusses the Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont treatment of
nonresident standing. While acknowledging that any language concerning nonresident
standing was dictum, the court concluded from the general tenor of the opinion that
standing should be granted. Id. at 97, 272 A.2d at 767. See also Al Walker, Inc. v.
Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 652 (1957); Borough of Leonia v.
Borough of Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 151 A.2d 540 (1959).
36. Al Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 372 (1957)
(granted a nonresident standing to challenge a zoning ordinance that would have ad-
versely affected his mobile home business; Borough of Creskill v. Borough of Dumont
was not discussed).
37. The three states are Connecticut, Kansas and Illinois. For a discussion of
Connecticut, see note 38 infra; for a discussion of Kansas, see note 39 infra; for a
discussion of Illinois, see note 40 infra.
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defining standing which had to be interpreted, whereas there was no
such construction required in Scott. These cases involved three differ-
ent types of statutes. One type of statute limits challenges of zoning
actions to "aggrieved" parties. 8 Similarly, another type of statute gives
standing to persons whose property has been "affected" by the zoning
decision." A third type of statute gives "adjoining" property owners
the right to protest zoning changes.
40
A decision based on statutory construction normally is of neither
mandatory nor persuasive value in a decision not in involving that
statute.41  This principle seems to be relevant to those cases which
construe the statutory terms "affected" and "adjoining" property own-
ers.42  However, it might be argued that cases which construe the
statutory term "aggrieved" could have been of some persuasive value
to the Scott court for two reasons. First, the term "aggrieved" is an
ambiguous standard which is used in determining that persons suffer-
ing a sufficient harm will be granted standing. Second, the meaning
of "aggrieved" is the product of a long history of judicial construction.
The requirement that one be "aggrieved" in order to have standing
derives from the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,43 published in
38. Connecticut has granted standing to nonresidents owning property adjoining
the property subject to the change. Hamelin v. Zoning Board of the Borough of Wal-
lingford, 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955). The court determined that nonresi-
dents so situated were "aggrieved" within the meaning of Connecticut General Statutes
section 286c.
39. Kansas nonresidents were given standing to challenge a zoning change in
Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962). They satisfied the
statutory requirement because they had an interest in property affected by the zoning
change. Id. at 714, 371 P.2d at 117, discussing KAN. GEN. STAT. § 12-712 (1949).
40. Illinois nonresidents were granted standing in Whittingham v. Village of
Woodridge, 111 Ill. App. 2d 147, 249 N.E.2d 332 (1969). The decision was based par-
tially on a statute which requires a 2/3 vote to pass a zoning change that has been
challenged by 20 percent of the "adjoining" property owners. The term "adjoining"
was construed to include property owners across municipal boundary lines. Id. at 152,
249 N.E.2d at 334. Another Illinois case recognized that "adjoining" property in-
cludes property outside the boundaries dividing separate zoning districts. Schwartz v.
Congregation Powolei Zeduck, 8 Ill. App. 2d 438, 131 N.E.2d 785 (1956). But cf.
Krembs v. County of Cook, 212 Ill. App. 2d 148, 257 N.E.2d 120 (1970).
41. "[A] decision which is good authority at home may be of no value in an-
other jurisdiction, on account of differences in the legal systems of the two states. For
instance, if the judgment in the case turns entirely upon the provisions of a statute,
it will not be available in another state, unless the statute law of the latter jurisdiction
is substantially the same in this respect." BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCrION
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws 436 (1896).
42. Unlike the "aggrieved person" requirement, these statutory requirements do
not appear to have been widely adopted. Cf. Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Require-
mnent in Zoning, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 294 (1967). Consequently, the statutes pro-
tecting "adjoining" and "affected" landowners do not have the long history of judicial
construction that the "aggrieved person" requirement has.
43. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act- was. sponsored by the United States
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1924 by the United States Department of Commerce and subsequently
adopted by many states, though not by California. The meaning of
"aggrieved" has evolved in the past five decades solely through judicial
interpretation. 44  Therefore, it could have been argued persuasively
that cases construing "aggrieved" have been the product of judicial dis-
cretion and have not been grounded in explicit statutory terminology.
45
But the Scott court did not articulate such an argument. In fact, the
Scott decision proferred no explanation for using cases grounded in
statutory construction.
Decisions Denying Standing To Nonresidents
Another deficiency with Scott's treatment of authority was its
failure to mention New York decisions, which have been the least
receptive of all state decisions to the pleas of nonresidents adversely
affected by land use decisions. The courts of that state have consis-
tently held that nonresidents cannot challenge onerous zoning decisions
because they own no property within the boundaries of the munici-
pality making the decision.46
Possibly the most serious deficiency in Scott's use of authority was
its citation of a case which had been overruled by implication. In
1963, the Colorado Supreme Court permitted protesting nonresidents
to intervene in a suit challenging a zoning change.4 7  After recogniz-
Department of Commerce. The act is now out of print, but it is reproduced at 3 RATH-
KOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 100-1 to 100-6 (3d ed. 1956).
44. Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 294, 295 n.7 (1967).
45. "It would be wasteful for courts not to utilize ... statutory materials when
they are so readily available for analogy as well as adoption. The statutes that protect
specified classes of people from specified risks in specified areas are rich sources of
analogy.
When a judicial rule is thus modelled after a statutory rule, the very fact of copy-
ing signifies that it is not to be confused with interpretation that clarifies an obscure
statute or amplifies a skeletal one. Such a judicial rule takes on a life of its own
in the common law. It can prove endlessly useful within its own orbit and may even
serve as a model itself for successive judge-made rules." Traynor, Statutes Revolving
in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 401, 416, 419 (1968).
46. Town of Huntington v. Town Bd. of the Town of Oyster Bay, 57 Misc. 2d
821, 293 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (adjoining town prohibited from challenging
neighboring town's zoning change although the change would have burdened the com-
plaining town with increased traffic); Wood v. Freeman, 43 Misc. 2d 616, 251 N.Y.S.
2d 996 (1965) (nonresident property owners denied power to challenge variance per-
mitting a pitch-and-putt golf course because they were "not aggrieved"); Browning v.
Bryant, 178 Misc. 576, 34 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1942), afj'd 264 App. Div. 777, 34
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1942) (nonresidents denied standing to challenge a determination
which allowed oil storage tanks to be built on adjoining property across a municipal
boundary).
47. Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d 96 (1963).
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ing that the zoning change would confer similar detriments on resi-
dents and nonresidents alike, the court concluded that "[cilearly those re-
siding [in the adjoining community] are entitled to intervention. ... "I
Four years later, that same court refused to allow an affected nonresi-
dent the right to challenge a zoning change4" and proclaimed that "it
[is] clear that plaintiffs have no standing. . . ."I' Inexplicably, the
Colorado Supreme Court failed to mention its earlier conflicting deci-
sion. The Scott court conveniently cited the earlier opinion but omitted
any reference to the later case.51
Criticism of the Scott Court's Approach
It is apparent that the California Supreme Court took a great
deal of liberty with the authority it cited to support its decision permit-
ting standing for nonresidents. It did so by relying heavily on dicta
from Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont,52 by relying on
cases that were decided on the basis of statutory construction, 53 by
ignoring authority from New York,54 and by failing to cite a later
Colorado case which contradicted the case it did cite for support.55
If the court had examined the cases on this issue more closely, it might
not have claimed to "find the foregoing authorities persuasive." 56
It is suggested that the Scott court relied too much on muddled
case authority from other states and too little on straightforward, co-
gent reasoning. The impact of zoning decisions does not cease at the
artificial lines dividing municipalities. If a neighboring property owner
is adversely affected by a zoning decision, it seems eminently sensible
that he should have standing to challenge it regardless of where the
political boundary line ends. If social and economic injury is not con-
fined exclusively within certain political boundary lines, judicial relief
should not be so confined.
The Similarities Between Standing Requirements For
Residents and Nonresidents
Since nonresidents in California now have standing in court to
challenge potentially adverse land use decisions,57 the remedies should
48. Id. at 574, 384 P.2d at 100.
49. Clark v. City of Colorado Springs, 162 Colo. 593, 428 P.2d 359 (1967).
50. Id. at 596, 428 P.2d at 361.
51. 6 Cal. 3d at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
52. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
53. See notes 38-41 supra.
54. See note 46 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
56. 6 Cal. 3d at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
57. One of the major ambiguities of Scott concerns the question of which adverse
effects will be recognized by courts as interests deserving protection. See note 3 supra
be essentially the same for residents and nonresidents. Either class of
aggrieved citizens should be able to secure judicial relief by petitioning
for a writ of mandamus.5" Ordinary mandamus is the appropriate writ
if the administrative action is in the form of a zoning ordinance,59
while administrative mandamus is appropriate if the administrative
body's decision was a quasi-judicial exercise of discretion."' Thus,
because the granting of either a variance of a conditional use permit
is a quasi-judicial administrative act, the appropriate judicial remedy
is administrative mandamus. 61  With either form of mandamus, the
court must first determine that the petitioning party is "beneficially
interested"62 in the local agency's decision before a writ of mandate
will issue. Prior to Scott, a resident could show such a beneficial in-
terest by alleging that there had been an actual or potential interfer-
ence with his rights of property or person.65 After Scott, a nonresi-
dent should be able to establish a beneficial interest by alleging the
existence of some interference with his property64 or his personal
rights.65
for six common adverse effects. In fact, the nature of the harm to Scott and his fellow
nonresidents was never specified. The court merely mentioned that the development
would block the view of nonresidents. 6 Cal. 3d at 545, 492 P.2d at 1138-39, 99 Cal.
Rptr. at 746-47. In addition to this aesthetic harm, it can be presumed that the de-
velopment would have reduced neighboring property values.
58. See text accompanying notes 62-65 infra. See generally CALIFORNIA ZONING
PRACTICE, supra note 9, at §§ 12.1-12.14 (1969).
59. Ordinary mandamus is an extraordinary writ designed to compel performance
of a clear ministerial duty and to review the validity of a quasi-legislative action such
as zoning ordinances. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085 (West 1955). For examples of
successful attacks on a zoning ordinance by means of ordinary mandamus, see Roman
Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955);
Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938).
60. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5 (West 1955). See generally W. DEERING, CAL-
IFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS §§ 2.1-2.7 (1966).
61. Both the conditional use permit and variance are forms of zoning relief
granted by administrative bodies. A conditional use permit allows special types of uses,
such as churches and schools; these special uses nust be permitted if the plans satisfy
the criteria established in the ordinance. However, a variance is permitted only to
alleviate a situation in which, for no public reason, uniform zoning for an area burdens
one parcel of land more stringently than others. The variance may permit minor de-
partures from the zoning ordinance in regard to the size of the structure to be built
or the variance may permit a different use of the property than would normally be
permitted. HAGMAN, supra note 4, at 105, 106, 113.
62. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1086 (West 1955).
63. Silva v. City of Cypress, 204 Cal. App. 2d 374, 22 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1962);
cf. Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 170 Cal. App. 2d 619, 339 P.2d 914
(1959) ("beneficial interest" demonstrated where the effect of the challenged decision
was to decrease the property value of petitioner's land).
64. 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
65. Scott implies that standing should be granted to nonresidents even if they
have no present property interest to protect. 6 Cal. 3d at 547 n.5, 492 P.2d at 1140
n.5, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 748 n.5. See text accompanying notes 147-154 infra.
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Although the manner in which the decision was reached can be
questioned, the Scott court's decision to grant standing to nonresidents
complements two other protections which the decision affords nonresi-
dents: the right to receive notice and a prior hearing6" and the right
to have their interests equally considered in the process of making
land use decisions. 7  This note will now explore these two aspects
of the Scott holding.
Duty to Give Notice and Hear Nonresidents' Views
A corollary protection to granting nonresidents standing is the
added protection they gain by injecting their views into the planning
stage of zoning decisions whenever those decisions might ultimately af-
fect their property. There are two reasons why standing to challenge
a zoning decision would, by itself, be an inadequate remedy for ag-
grieved nonresidents. First, once a zoning decision is reached without
the benefit of nonresidents' views, there is little likelihood that it will
be reversed because the scope of judicial review is always narrow after
the fact. Generally, a municipality's zoning decision is upheld unless
the petitioner establishes to the court's satisfaction that the decision is
not supported by the finding of fact 68 or that it is arbitrary and capri-
cious. 69  Second, input from affected nonresidents is important at the
local level because they are not likely to seek judicial relief unless they
have both the time and financial resources or they believe the zoning
decision is particularly onerous.
70
66. See text accompanying notes 79-87 infra.
67. See text accompanying note 99 infra.
68. When the local land use decision is an administrative decision, i.e., either
a variance or a conditional use permit, the decision will not be overturned unless (1)
the decision is not supported by the findings of fact or (2) the findings of fact are
not supported by the evidence. This latter requirement can only be met if the court
determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the
whole record. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1094.5(b)-(c) (West 1955). Regardless of
whether the variance or conditional use permit was granted or denied, there exists a
presumption that an "official duty has been regularly performed." C&L. EvID. CODE §
664 (West 1966). Accordingly, very few variances or conditional use permits are ju-
dicially invalidated. CALmORNMu ZONING PRACTIcE, supra note 9, at §§ 7.52, 7.77.
69. E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.
2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d
38 (1949).
70. Most state courts use this legal standard to assess the validity of a munici-
pality's action. However, the application of this standard varies between different jur-
isdictions. For example, one knowledgeable commentator estimates that while the Cali-
fornia courts have upheld municipalities' actions approximately 95 percent of the time,
the rate of municipal success is approximately 75 percent in New Jersey, and only 50
percent in Ohio and Minnesota. Hagman, Book Review, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 469,
479 (1967). No comprehensive explanation has yet been given for this disparity in
judicial perspective. Id. at 479-80.
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A Nonresident's Right to Hearing Prior to Scott
Prior to the Scott decision, there were few decisions which recog-
nized a nonresident's right to receive notice and to be given an oppor-
tunity to air his grievances. While the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated in Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont that municipali-
ties must hear the complaints of affected nonresidents, 1 it did not
require municipalities to give a prior notice of the hearing. 72
Statutory requirements have provided the basis for the few deci-
sions which have required the airing of nonresidents' complaints. 73
However, the ordinances involved in these cases do not require that
prior notice of the hearing be given to the nonresidents; they merely
included nonresidents among those neighboring property owners who
could register their protests.
Another common type of ordinance might be construed to pro-
vide nonresidents a right to prior notice of a hearing. These ordi-
nances require that notice of the hearing be mailed to owners of prop-
erty located within 300 feet (or some similar distance) of the pro-
posed development.7 ' Thus, nonresidents are arguably afforded some
protection under these statutes because they fail to exclude nonresidents
specifically from their purview. There has been a paucity of appellate
cases construing these statutes. Indian Wells had such an ordinance
and Scott claimed protection under it, but the court refused to inter-
pret the ordinance.75
Some judges and commentators oppose any requirement of a
hearing for affected nonresidents because it allegedly infringes on the
71. 15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441, 445 (1954).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Whittingham v. Village of Woodridge, 111 Ill. App. 2d 147, 249
N.E.2d 332 (1969); Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962).
74. E.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12.32(C) (1) (b) (1970) requires that
notice of a proposed zoning change be sent to the "owners of all property within 300
feet of the area proposed to be changed as shown upon the records of the City Clerk."
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. CITY PLANNING CODE § 306.3(a)(2) (1969) contains essentially
the same requirement with the additional provision that failure to give notice will not
invalidate the proceeding if the address of a property owner within the 300 foot radius
was not on the assessment roll. Neither statute explicitly excludes nonresidents from
its purview. However, nonresidents would be effectively excluded because their prop-
erty would not be listed in the city's property records. See also ALI MODEL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-304 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1970). In the interest of having
a readily ascertainable standard, the proposed model code gives standing to every owner
of property located within 500 feet of the proposed development. ALI MODEL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 9-103 to 9-105 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971). See also N.J.
MUNICIPALITIES & COUNTIES STAT. 40:55-44 (1968), which requires that all landowners
within 200 feet of the property to be affected by a zoning appeal must be given prior
notice of the hearing whether those landowners live in or outside of the municipality.
75. 6 Cal. 2d at 545, 492 P.2d at 1139, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
[Vol. 25
February 19741 MUNICIPAL LAND USE: NONRESIDENTS' INTEREST 751
municipality's traditional sovereignty.7 The reasoning implicit in this
approach is that a municipality is responsible only to and for its resi-
dents, taxpayers and voters. According to this logic, it would be
anomolous to require the citizens of a municipality to elect and pay
for that municipality's governmental functions while simultaneously re-
quiring the municipality to hear the views of outsiders before making
decisions.
It is submitted that such a position exalts formality over reality
and truly makes "a fetish out of invisible municipal boundary lines.
''
77
Scott declared that a combination of common sense, wise public policy
and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose a
duty on a municipality to notify and hear the views of affected non-
residents.
78
The Due Process Requirement For A Prior Hearing
The aspect of Scott which requires municipalities to give non-
residents notice of a prior hearing was based upon the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79  As stated in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the due process clause requires "at
a minimum . . . that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adju-
dication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing ... "1,0
This requirement for a prior hearing is not explicitly applicable in a
situation where, as in Scott, there is no "deprivation" of property but
merely governmental action which adversely affects property.81 The
Scott court recognized this difference82 but it attempted to justify its
expansion of the prior hearing protection to "affected property" by
76. See Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 715, 371 P.2d 113, 117 (1962),
where dissenting justice Robb argued that nonresidents should be excluded from local
legislative processes. But cf. Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965
WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 123-24 (1965).
77. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d
441, 446 (1954).
78. 6 Cal. 3d at 548-49, 492 P.2d at 1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
79. Id.
80. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
81. The term "deprivation" denotes "a taking altogether, a seizure, a direct ap-
propriation, dispossession of the owner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 529 (rev. 4th ed.
1968). "Affected" property is not the same as property that has been taken or confis-
cated. The term "affected" denotes having been "[alcted upon, influenced or changed."
TH AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 21 (1971).
82. "Zoning does not deprive an adjacent landowner of his property, but it is
clear that the individual's interest in his property is often affected by local land use
controls, and the 'root requirement' of the due process clause is 'that an individual be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest . . . .' (Boddie v. Connecticut, [citation omitted])." 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492
P.2d at 1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
quoting from Boddie v. Connecticut.3 However, Boddie only held
that a prior hearing is required before a person can be "deprived of
any significant property interest.184  This language from Boddie does
not adequately justify Scott's expansive reading of the due process
clause. Whereas the term "deprive""5 is used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 6 due process protections are required by Scott when
property is merely "affected" by a land use decision. Moreover, this
interpretation is not desirable because it would require that munici-
palities give all affected nonresidents a prior hearing before even the
most innocuous land use decisions could be made. The summary
treatment of due process requirements is another example of the Scott
court veiling the significance and novelty of its holding."7
83. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
84. Id. at 379. After a discussion of the due process clause, the Court held that
Connecticut violated that standard by statutorily requiring payment of court fees and
costs for service of process as conditions precedent to bringing suit for divorce. Id.
at 380-81. Problems like that in Boddie require a court to undertake a balancing proc-
ess in analyzing the interests of individuals who desire a prior hearing before their
property interests are adversely affected as opposed to the interests of governmental
decision makers in executing decisions quickly without time consuming hearings. The
dual test which the United States Supreme Court set forth in Boddie is that a person
must demonstrate that he has been 1) "deprived" of a 2) "significant property interest"
before he can be afforded a prior hearing. Id. at 379.
85. Courts have frequently answered the question of what constitutes a "signifi-
cant property interest." E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). However, the issue of what constitutes
a "deprivation" has seldom been explained by the courts. See notes 89-91 and accom-
panying text inf!a.
86. "No state shall . . . deprive any person of ... property, without due process
of law ....... U.S. Const. amend XIV, cl. 1.
87. There may seem to be a conflict in Scott between the broad language which
states that the due process clause requires a prior hearing for all affected landowners,
6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50, and the more restrictive
language which states that Indian Wells owes nonresident landowners "a duty of notice
to the extent given similarly situated city residents." Id. One conclusion which has
been drawn from this apparent inconsistency is that "[t]he court's solution fails to
measure up to the breadth of the due process premise the court had asserted." Note,
Notice Requirements to Parties Outside of City's Zoning, in The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia 1971-1972, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 273, 600 (1973). However, this note maintains
that the due process discussion is not mere dictum. First, it is likely that the court
simply used this more restrictive language to grant relief to Scott and his neighbors
because they had petitioned for this type of relief. Appellant's Petition for Hearing
at 3, Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1972). All of the nonresident plaintiffs would be protected under an equal applica-
tion of the local hearing statute. Therefore, the relief they sought was phrased in
terms of receiving notice that it was received by similarly situated residents. See text
accompanying note 129 infra.
Second, by stating that nonresidents must be given the same notice as residents,
the scope of nonresidents' right to a hearing becomes necessarily dependent on the
determination of the scope of residents' right to a hearing. Since the due process clause
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The question of whether a hearing is required foranything short
of a "deprivation" of property has not been, uniformly answered.""
One federal district court required a prior hearing in a case involving
a lien imposed upon the property which would have seriously restricted
its uses.89 But another federal district court refused to permit a prior
hearing where property interests were merely "affected" on the ground
that deprivation "refers only to direct appropriation of an individual's
property."90
The overly broad due process standard enunciated in Scott ap-
parently has been modified in another recent Supreme Court decision,
City of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc.91 A prior hear-
ing may no longer be required whenever a land use decision "affects"
an individual's property, but only when a municipality proposes a
"substantial interference with land use."'9 2  In City of Escondido,93
protects landowners whose property is "affected by local land use controls," 6 Cal.
3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749, all affected residents would be
entitled to a prior hearing by Scott's terms. Therefore, to require a hearing for all
affected nonresidents is to give them notice to the extent given to similarly situated
residents.
Third, since Scott held that the city must consider the effect of its action with
respect to all neighboring property owners, it would be inconsistent to require the mu-
nicipality to consider the interests of nonresidents if those persons' interests were not
made known to the municipality initially through the normal hearing process.
Fourth, a California appellate court has labeled as a holding language in the Scott
opinion stating that all affected property owners are entitled to a prior hearing, Peo-
ple's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 873, 106 Cal. Rptr.
666, 669 (1973).
Scott's discussion of the due process requirement for a prior hearing thus was not
relegated to the character of dictum by the court's statement that Indian Wells owed
nonresidents the right of notice to the extent given similarly situated residents.
88. The issue of what interferences with property constitute "deprivations" has
not been widely discussed in the context of the requirement for a prior hearing. See
text accompanying notes 89-91 infra. However, that issue has been widely discussed
in the context of the Fifth Amendment's protection against "taking without just com-
pensation" since that provision has been incorporated into the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &
I. BANTA, THE TAxING Issun (1973); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE L.. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
89. "[Tlhe lien resulting from the entry of judgment, while not completely de-
priving the debtor from the use of his property, would nevertheless seriously restrict
his ability to sell it or use it for collateral." Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349,
1356 (D. Del. 1971).
90. California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport Mesa Unified School Dist., 333 F.
Supp. 436, 443 (C.D. Cal. 1971); accord, Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580, 592 (9th
Cir. 1959).
91. 8 Cal. 3d 785, 505 P.2d 1012, 106 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1973).
92. Id. at 790, 505 P.2d at 1016, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 176, citing Scott v. City of
Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 549, 492 P.2d 1137, 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1972).
93. 8 Cal. 3d785, 505 P.2d 1012, 106 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1973).
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the court held that a city ordinance prohibiting billboards adjacent to
freeways was a minimal interference with land use;94 therefore, a prior
hearing was not required. A subsequent appellate court decision has
recognized this change in the prior hearing requirement.95 People's
Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors ruled that a sweeping environ-
mental initiative constituted a substantial interference with land use
and thus was invalid because it failed to provide property owners with
a prior hearing.9 6
This slight alteration of Scott's approach in determining which
property owners are entitled to due process protections seems desir-
able. It avoids the breadth of the court's "affected" standard without
seriously stripping property owners of due process protections. Cal-
ifornia courts may now grant a prior hearing if the harm caused to a
person's property interest by local land use controls is "significant."
It would seem that the significance of the harm can be measured both
by the severity of the interference and by the substantiality of the
property interest. While this standard of "significance" is necessarily
ambiguous, it permits municipalities to make inconsequential land use
decisions without the time-consuming process of giving notice and
holding a public hearing. Yet this modification of the Scott hearing
requirement will not permit substantial interferences with property in-
terests if California courts continue to follow the spirit of Scott and
scrutinize municipal land use activities.
97
94. Id. at 791, 505 P.2d at 1010, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
95. "Scott . . . held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that an individual whose property is 'affected by local land use controls' be
given the opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest.
The recent case of City of Escondido . . . limited the constitutional and statutory
due process requirements to a proposal that involved a substantial interference with land
use . . . ." People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 873,
106 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 (1973).
96. Id. at 872, 874, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70; contra, San Diego Bldg. Contractors
Assn. v. City Council, 35 Cal. App. 3d 384, - Cal. Rptr. - (1973) (making land use
changes by initiative does not violate due process because affected landowners are given
sufficient notice of the possible zoning change and they have an opportunity to be
heard during the election process).
97. The indication from Scott that California courts may now scrutinize municipal
land use activity seems to disapprove the prior posture of upholding virtually all mu-
nicipal decisions. "Final municipal action on a zoning matter is more likely to be
sustained by the California courts than any other courts in the country. . . . California
courts tend to be planners' courts, sympathetic to the public, rather than attorneys'
courts, sympathetic to landowners. As a consequence, whatever the decision of the
zoning body, California courts tend to uphold it." CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTMIE supra
note 9 at § 1.6. See also D. Hagman, Book Review, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 469 (1967),
wherein the author estimates that as of 1966, the California courts had upheld the posi-
tion of the municipality in approximately 95 percent of the cases concerning local land
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Increase In Protection For Residents
The extent to which Scott protects nonresidents is dramatized by
the realization that this protection is even more extensive than that
traditionally afforded to residents affected by land use decisions. As
previously discussed, statutes regulating notice for hearings frequently
exclude property owners whose land lies beyond a specified distance
from the property subject to the zoning decisions. 98 Therefore, if a
proposed development was extensive enough to affect property beyond
this radius, many potentially affected residents living beyond the ra-
dius would not be entitled to a hearing. Application of Scott's due
process protections gives all affected nonresidents the right to a hearing
regardless of their proximity to the proposed development. The Peo-
ple's Lobby, Inc. court recognized that residents should also be given
the protection of a prior hearing if, according to Scott's broad terms,
they are individuals whose property is affected by local land use con-
trols.
99
Consideration of Effect on All Neighboring Property
The court in Scott not only gave affected nonresidents the twin
rights of standing and notice of and right to appear at a hearing, it also
imposed an affirmative duty on the city to consider any proposed de-
velopment with respect to its effect on all neighboring property own-
ers. 00 This suggests that the reasonableness of any city's decisions
will be at least partially determined by its impact on any property
affected by the decision. It appears that as a development becomes
more substantial, the radius of the affected area increases. Thus, it
use disputes. This contrasts with the ratio of municipal successes of approximately
75 percent in New Jersey, and only 50 percent in Ohio and Minnesota. Id. at 479.
The Scott court's implied approval of judicial interference in municipal activities does
not mean that the California Supreme Court is no longer a "progressive" land use court;
rather, it seems to reflect the recent change in what level of judicial scrutiny is con-
sidered to be a "progressive" approach. When zoning was first recognized as an ac-
ceptable planning tool, "progressive" courts readily upheld municipal zoning activity.
Thus, they encouraged systematic land use controls in contrast to the nonexistent or
erratic land use controls that had preceded zoning. Currently, "progressive" courts have
been and should be protecting the broader interests of the region as a whole when
those interests conflict with the narrow, selfish interests of the municipalities. Accord-
ingly, the interests of individual landowners should, as they did in Scott, prevail over
the interests of municipality when those individuals represent truly "regional" interest.
Cf. Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 114, 222 P.2d 439, 451 (1950) (dis-
sent); Hagman, Book Review, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 469 (1967). Both these authori-
ties express the opinion that courts should start examining municipal zoning action
more closely and should not uphold the municipality's action automatically.
98. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
99. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
100. 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
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would contravene the Scott holding to permit a municipality to con-
sider the effect of a development on only the immediately adjacent
property if, in fact, other property also would be affected.
This aspect of the Scott decision goes beyond most prior judicial
action in the United States by imposing on California municipalities
an affirmative duty to give full consideration to nonresidents' prop-
erty interests. A few state cases prior to Scott permitted a munici-
pality to look to regional needs in order to justify its zoning decisions. 1' 1
Other decisions, such as Kunzler v. Hoffman, 2 went a step further in
coaxing municipalities to adopt a regional perspective. The Kunz-
ler court remarked that although municipalities "have not yet been
compelled to recognize values that transcend municipal lines, they cer-
tainly should be encouraged to [do so]."' 3  Scott seems to have taken
the final step in this evolutionary process by making this extra-local
perspective a requirement in local land use decision-making. 4
Exclusionary Zoning Cases
Prior to Scott, cases other than those which involved adverse ef-
fects on neighboring property owners had required municipalities to
discard a parochial perspective and consider the effects of their con-
duct on legitimate interests outside their borders. These cases are
those labeled "exclusionary zoning" cases.' 0 5 The typical factual set-
ting in which exclusionary zoning cases arise is one where a munici-
pality seeks to maintain the status quo of its community by prohibiting
landowners from developing property with more dense housing0 6 or
101. See Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Caboux
v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 408 U.S.
924 (1972); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d
347 (1949).
102. 48 N.J. 227, 225 A.2d 321 (1966).
103. Id. at 287, 225 A.2d at 326.
104. Cf. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d
441, 445-46 (1954), where the court required the local body to fully consider the views
of affected nonresidents who actually appeared at the zoning hearing.
105. See generally Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a
Remedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 625 (1973); Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Sub-
urbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971);
Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider Regional
Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REV. 244 (1971); Note, Low-Income Housing in the Suburbs: The
Problem of Exclusionary Zoning, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1971); Comment, Exclusion-
ary Zoning from a Regional Perspective, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 239.
106. Where a smaller minimum lot size was sought, see Appeal of Kit-Mar Build-
ers, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Town-
ship Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (Four acre minimum lot
requirement invalidated). Where the attempted development was of a multi-unit struc-
ture, see Simmons v. City of Royal Oak, 38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972)
(single family dwelling restriction invalidated).
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some other use common to low or middle income neighborhoods. 10 7
Prospective developers challenge these actions on the ground that this
method of maintaining the status quo results in the exclusion of poor
or middle income individuals from the community . The municipality
generally attempts to justify its decision to deny development by rely-
ing on the presumed validity of its decision'0 8 and by arguing that the
development would unduly burden the city's existing facilities.0 9 Some
courts, however, have subjected these restrictions to close scrutiny and
have required the municipality to show that its decision promotes the
"general public welfare" in its broadest sense." 0 After discussing
much of the authority on this issue, one court has concluded that "the
strictly local interests of a municipality must yield if such conflict
with the overall state interests of the public at large.""' Such strict
judicial scrutiny requires local political units to face the realities of
growth responsibly. There has been some judicial recognition that
"the overall solution to these problems lies with greater regional plan-
ning," but until true regional planning becomes a reality, land use
decisions will continue to be made by various local governing units.
One court has declared that while this situation persists, it will not
tolerate municipalities abusing their power by "attempting to zone out
growth at the expense of neighboring communities.""' 8
Common policy considerations and similar legal principles link
these exclusionary zoning cases with the Scott case. At first glance,
it might appear that the competing interests in a case such as Scott
107. See, e.g., Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252
N.E.2d 765 (1969) (trailer park development); Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich.
App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971) (trailer park development).
108. See, e.g., Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322
(1971). Michigan takes a unique approach to the normal presumption of validity
where the municipality excludes land uses that have a "favored status." This favored
status may come from Michigan's "State Constitution, statutes, judicial precedents, or
a combination of these factors." Id. at 211-12, 192 N.W.2d at 325. Land uses which
have attained this favored status include churches, schools, hospitals, natural resources,
and mobile homes, Id. at 212-17, 192 N.W.2d at 325-27. Apartment buildings have also
attained this status. Simmons v. City of Royal Oak, 38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d
811 (1972). In such cases, the presumption of validity is reversed and the municipal-
ity has the burden of justifying the exclusion. Id. at 497, 196 N.W.2d at 812; Bristow
v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. at 210-11, 192 N.W.2d at 324-25.
109. E.g., Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
110. Simmons v. City of Royal Oak, 38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972);
Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 218, 192 N.W.2d 322, 328 (1971);
cf. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsch,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd.
of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
111. Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 218, 192 N.W.2d 322,
328 (1971).
112. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 476, 268 A.2d 765, 769 (1970).
113. Id.
are wholly different from those interests involved in exclusionary zon-
ing cases. In Scott, a property owner was successful in challenging
a developer with whom a municipality had fully cooperated. In the
exclusionary zoning cases, courts have permitted a developer to build
against the wishes of the community. Whereas the developer's inter-
ests are contrary to those of the nonresidents in situations like Scott,
in exclusionary zoning cases the developer is the party who represents
the interests of the nonresident." 4  Thus the similarity between these
two types of cases lies in the fact that in both situations courts have
compelled the municipalities to act responsibly in relation to nonresi-
dents' interests.
Without judicial action in these exclusionary zoning cases, non-
residents would be harmed by the conduct of the city which attempts
to limit growth. Absent judicial intervention, the city could continue
to deny an unascertainable constituency a theoretical expectancy.
This judicial protection of the interest of outsiders is justified since the
outsiders, though unascertained and without sufficient motivation to
engage in the present litigation, are still part of the public whose inter-
ests should be considered in determining if the municipality's action
promotes the general public welfare. In fact, the interests of the out-
siders should be a persuasive factor in a court's determination of
whether the municipality's prohibition of further development was rea-
sonable. If there was no real growth in the area and no real need for
further housing, then prohibiting or inhibiting development would not
be unreasonable. Conversly, if a genuine regional housing shortage
existed, limitations on development would be more difficult to justify.
Admittedly, the exclusionary zoning cases arise in a factual con-
text different from that in Scott, but the legal principle presented in
each type of case seems identical. That principle requires municipal-
ities to act responsibly in relation to interests outside their borders,
whether those interests be neighboring property owners or unascer-
tained potential residents.
Antiparochial Perspective Foreshadowed in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
While the judiciary has only recently enforced this anti-parochial
perspective, its origin dates back to 1926 when the United States Su-
preme Court decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co." 5 Al-
114. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). The court
explained that while the exclusionary zoning problem is generally depicted as involving
a deprivation of due process by limiting a developer's use of his land, "it cannot realis-
tically be detached from the rights of other people desirous of moving into the area
'in search of a comfortable place to live.'" Id. at 474 n.6, 268 A.2d at 768 n.6.
115. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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though the Court upheld the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning,
it also recognized certain limits on the authority of a municipality in
making local land use decisions. While the court permitted the city of
Euclid to have industrial growth at its city limits by the use of its zoning
power, it warned: "It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the
possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far out-
weigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not
be allowed to stand in the way."'
1 6
This priority of the "general public interest" over the narrow in-
terests of the municipality is a limitation on the exercise of local police
power.117 The municipality's police power must be exercised to pro-
mote the "public health, safety, morals, or general welfare"" 8 but it is
unclear what constituency comprises the "public." Euclid stated that
the "general public interest" transcends the selfish "interest of the mu-
nicipality," 1 9 but this statement went unnoticed for many years. State
courts have consistently construed "public" as embracing only the citi-
zens of the municipality. 20 California courts have implicitly accepted
this narrow definition of "public.'' For example, Miller v. Board
of Public Works'2 2 upheld an interim zoning ordinance because it pro-
moted the general welfare of the "city as a whole."' 2
This narrow view of the "general public interest" was virtually
unchallenged through the infancy of zoning. During that time, mu-
nicipalities were functionally more independent and physically more
isolated than they are now. Consequently, the interests of municipali-
ties seldom clashed with regional interests or with the interests of
neighboring nonresidents.
Today, greatly increased urban and suburban growth has com-
116. Id. at 390.
117. The Euclid decision stated that the limitations on municipal authority were
the organic law of its creation and the state and federal constitutions. 272 U.S. at
389. Whether this priority in favor of the general public interest is considered as com-
ing from the limitation inherent in its organic law or from the Federal Constitution,
its ultimate source is the same. The organic law creating local zoning power is usually
the state enabling legislation in which the state delegates its police power over local
land use to the municipality. The limits attached to this power coming from the or-
ganic law ultimately merge into the constitutional requirement that the police power
be exercised to promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
118. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
119. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
120. See, e.g., Crum v. Bray, 121 Ga. 709, 49 S.E. 686 (1905); County of Cook
v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N.E. 512 (1924); City of New Orleans v. Calamari,
150 La. 738, 91 So. 172 (1922); State v. Sugarman, 126 Minn. 477, 148 N.W. 466
(1914).
121. E.g., Odd Fellows' Cemetery Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 140
Cal. 226, 73 P. 987 (1903); In re Ackerman, 6 Cal. App. 5, 91 P. 429 (1907).
122. 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927).
123. Id. at 496, 234 P. at 388.
monly resulted in a megalopolis composed of contiguous municipali-
ties.124 Boundaries between these separate zoning units now exist as
theoretical division lines rather than as true geographical community
parameters. The Scott court recognized these changed social circum-
stances:
In the early days of zoning, when there were "large undeveloped
areas at the borders of two contiguous towns," [citations omitted]
the municipality's responsibility in using its zoning power might
extend only to the municipal boundary lines. In today's sprawling
metropolitan complexes, however, municipal boundary lines rarely
indicate where urban development ceases. 12
5
Since the impact of local land use decisions is often not confined to
municipal borders, the municipality's responsibility often should not be
so confined. 126  Recognizing the common sense of this approach,
Scott imposed on municipalities the duty to consider the effect of their
land use decisions on all neighboring property.' 27
Potential Impact of Scott
The California Supreme Court took a very broad approach in
Scott to a case that could have been decided on very narrow grounds.
The decision's wide scope is reflected in the court's holding, which
granted relief more extensive than the appellant sought, and in its rec-
ognition of general land use problems reflected by, but not limited
to, Scott's specific factual setting. From this broad approach, it may
reasonably be predicted that California courts will, or at least should,
take a firm position against parochial land use decisions.
128
When Albert Scott petitioned the California Supreme Court for a
hearing of the case, his grounds for doing so were that Indian Wells
had violated its own notice-of-hearing ordinance and that a scenic ease-
ment had been established under Civil Code section 801(8)129 The
124. See note 4 supra.
125. 6 Cal. 3d at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
126. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3514 (West 1970), "One must so use his own rights
as not to infringe upon the rights of another."
127. 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
128. Not all "progressive" land use decisions have had the potent impact expected
of them. One of the pre-eminent land use jurists in the country has asked plaintively
in a dissent what has happened to the "landmark decisions" of New Jersey. Vickers
v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 262, 181 A.2d 129, 145 (1962) (Hall, J. dissenting),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). Justice Hall was referring to Borough of Cress-
kill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) (see notes 29-33 supra)
and Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 349
(1949). These two New Jersey cases closely parallel the Scott decision in terms of the
issues presented and the progressive judicial posture.
129. Appellant's Petition for Hearing at 3, 4, Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.
3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
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court could have granted judicial relief under at least the first of these
theories' 30 and thereby avoided the broader problems involved in the
conflict between a municipality and nonresidents.
Alternatively, the court could have acknowledged due process
rights of nonresidents to receive notice and have their views heard at a
hearing, but affirmed the trial court's decision because those require-
ments were actually met. Scott did receive notice of the proposed de-
velopment' 3 ' and did appear at the planning commission hearing and
made his views known.132  He also appeared at the city council meet-
ing where he read aloud a petition opposing the development. 133 The
court recognized these facts, yet it did not affirm the lower court on
the basis of mootness. It chose instead to decisively oppose the mu-
nicipality's parochial action.
The court also could have recognized that the nonresidents were
harmed, but then it could have denied them a remedy on the basis
of Government Code section 65801. That section provides that no
zoning action shall be set aside for procedural error, including failure
to give notice, unless a court decides that the error was prejudicial,
that it caused substantial injury, and that a different action probably
would have resulted had there been no error.'34 It is highly probable
that reconsideration of this matter would not have caused a different
result, for Indian Wells had repeatedly demonstrated that it was not
going to permit the desires of nonresidents to interfere with the
planned development.'3 5 The court refused to construe section 65801
narrowly and stated that when the matter was returned to the local
level, the consideration of "the rights, desires, suggestions, and welfare
[of nonresidents] may well yield a 'different result.' "31
130. It is unlikely that Scott would have been successful in contending that the
development would violate his visual easement. California courts long ago repudiated
the English doctrine of ancient lights under which a landowner acquires, by uninter-
rupted use, an easement over adjoining land for the passage of light and air. Easements
for light and air and visual easements are created only by express grant or covenant.
E.g., Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 843 (1898); Western Granite & Marble
Co. v. Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. 111, 37 P. 192 (1894); Katcher v. Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 245 Cal. App. 2d 425, 53 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1966).
131. 6 Cal. 3d at 544, 492 P.2d at 1138, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
132. Id. at 545, 492 P.2d at 1139, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
133. Id. at n.2.
134. Id. at 550, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
135. "Since the Indian Wells planning commission, city council, and officials were
determined to proceed regardless of the wishes of the nonresidents, and even fought
the matter to the California Supreme Court, there is some doubt that consideration of
the 'rights, desires, suggestions, and welfare' of the nonresidents 'may well yield a dif-
ferent result.' But the court so found, laying to rest any fear that courts will give
any over-literal interpretation to Gov't C. § 65801." CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE,
supra note 9 at § 4.17 (1973 Supplement).
136. 6 Cal. 3d at 550, 492 P.2d at 1142-43, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750-51.
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It is clear, then, that the court could have decided Scott on nar-
row grounds. Instead, it eschewed such an approach and focused its
attention on the wide-ranging problems resulting from the fragmenta-
tion of land use decisions "[i]n today's sprawling metropolitan com-
plexes."'37  Expressing its concern over the exercise of municipal land
use powers without regard to regional impact, the court cited cases
with language that emphatically stressed the importance of regional
considerations. 138  This orientation can, as one prominent commenta-
tor has stated, "be read broadly as frowning on municipal parochialism
in land-use controls in California."' 3 9
Possible Extensions Of Scott
The likelihood that Scott will have broad-ranging application be-
yond its own narrow factual setting is supported by the recent case of
People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors.'4" In that case, the
Board of Supervisors of Santa Cruz County refused to place an envi-
ronmental initiative on the ballot which would have substantially re-
stricted the use of land near the coast of Santa Cruz County. The
court of appeals held that the initiative was properly kept off the bal-
lot because, if enacted, it would have violated Scott: affected prop-
erty owners would not have been given a hearing before the statute
became effective.' 4 ' People's Lobby, Inc. applied the Scott prior hear-
ing requirement even though the facts differed in three respects. First,
the case involved the rights of residents, and not nonresidents.,4 2  Sec-
ond, the proposed land use decision would have been implemented
through the initiative process; that process, unlike typical zoning pro-
cedure, fails to afford anyone a prior hearing. 143  Finally, Peo-
ple's Lobby, Inc. involved a land use decision that was not strictly a
zoning decision. 44  These three extensions of the requirement of a
137. 6 Cal. 3d at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
138. Id. "When the effects of change are felt beyond the point of its immediate
impact, it is fatuous to expect that controlling such change remains a local problem
to be solved by local methods." People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5
Cal. 3d 480, 498, 487 P.2d 1193, 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 564 (1971). Borough of
Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) (discussed at note
29-33 supra).
139. Donald Hagman in CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 5.46
(1973 Supplement).
140. 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973).
141. Id. at 873, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. There are other local land use controls in addition to zoning. Scott stated
that the prior hearing requirement would be applicable whenever landowners are af-
fected by "local land use controls." 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr.
at 749. It is uncertain for which of the following six types of non-zoning local land
use controls California courts will now protect affected landowners with the prior
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prior hearing seem to have been foreshadowed by the broad approach
taken in Scott._
45
Scott may be extended into many other land use problems; four
merit special attention. First, the principles enunciated in Scott, by
their own terms, will be used by nonresidents as protection against a
municipality that is "pro-development." Conversely, those same
principles can also be used by a municipality when it seeks to avoid
growth. For example, if a municipality's limitation on growth is chal-
lenged by a prospective developer, that municipality could buttress its
position by showing an adverse effect on neighboring property outside
its boundaries.1
46
An indication of a second important possible extension of Scott
hearing requirement.
(1) Subdivision Control-regulation of lots split for the purpose of residential develop-
ment. The local control includes dedication of land for use as streets, utilities or other
"public" purposes. See generally CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE, supra note 9, at §
3.46-3.52; D. HAGMAN, supra note 4, at H9 134-140 (1971).
(2) Building and Housing Codes-local regulation of construction specifications en-
acted and enforced to establish minimum health and safety standards. Building codes
establish such standards with regard to new structures, whereas housing codes regulate
existing structures. See generally CALFoRNIA ZONING PRACTICE, supra at H9 3.5-3.6;
D. HAGMAN, supra at §§ 152-57.
(3) Governmental Prohibition of Nuisances-promulgation of local ordinances regu-
lating or prohibiting offensive land uses. See generally CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE,
supra at §§ 3.24-3.34; D. HAGMAN, supra at § 159.
(4) Eminent Domain-exercises by the local government of its power to take property
for public use with just compensation paid to the landowner whose property is taken.
See generally CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTIcE, supra at 9H 3.7-3.23; D. HAGMAN, supra at
173-187.
(5) Local Property Taxes-local taxation of land with exceptions or other forms of
preferential treatment for desired uses such as agricultural land, urban redevelopment,
open space, or "clean" industry. Also, local taxes are sometimes imposed in the form
of special assessment on property owners who derive special benefit from an improve-
ment. See generally CAUFORNIA ZONING PRACCE, supra at § 3.53-3.66; D. HAGMAN,
supra at H§ 188-200.
(6) Creation of Official Maps-specification by the local government of the location
of future streets, park sites and other public improvements, the selection of which ne-
cessarily prevents other developments on those sites. See generally D. AGMAN, supra
at § 14t)-51.
145. See text accompanying notes 129-139 supra.
146. This is essentially the approach taken by some courts in permitting a muni-
cipality to recognize outside considerations in order to justify the prohibition of a par-
ticular use. For example, in Cadoux v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 425,
294 A.2d 582 (1972), a small residential community had refused to permit additional
commercial uses. That decision was upheld because one shopping center already ex-
isted in the town and residents had access to satisfactory additional shopping areas
in the region. See also Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955);
Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957); Duffcon
Cement Prods. Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 NJ. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
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appears in an inconspicuous footnote 1 7 and provides a clue to the posi-
tion that the supreme court may take when an exclusionary zoning
case reaches it. Indian Wells unsuccessfully employed Silva v. City of
Cypress'45 to argue that Scott had no standing. In Silva, the plaintiff
sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the defendant city from issuing
a variance which would have permitted the construction of a drive-in
theatre. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied because
it contained neither an allegation that the petitioner owned any af-
fected property nor one that he was actually or potentially aggrieved.' 49
The Scott court reiterated these reasons for the denial of mandamus
to Silva,'50 but then it added this sentence: "Nor, in that case, did
the plaintiff allege that the land use control in question, whose effect
was only local, effectively precluded his owning land or residing in
the affected area."'' This sentence neither paraphrased an idea ex-
pressed in Silva nor served to distinguish Silva from Scott. The sen-
tence's meaning seems inescapable; a nonresident could challenge a
land use decision if he alleges that it precludes his residing or owning
property in the area.
The novelty of this proposition must not be overlooked. No pre-
vious California decision has permitted a nonresident to challenge a
land use decision that excluded him from a community. While many
legal commentators have offered arguments favoring standing for such
an individual,' - no reported case has permitted such standing.'53 It
is true that the sentence is dictum, yet it is nevertheless significant. In
that sentence, the California Supreme Court intimated that it would not
be inappropriate for a California court to give standing to an outsider
who has no present property interest to protect. Once again, the sig-
nificance of this proposition was camouflaged by the intimation that
the authority cited in Scott supported this approach. 54
A third possible extension of Scott is that California courts may
147. 6 Cal. 3d at 547 n.5, 492 P.2d at 1140 n.5, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 748 n.5.
148. 204 Cal. App. 2d 374, 22 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1962).
149. Id. at 377, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
150. 6 Cal. 3d at 547 n.5, 492 P.2d at 1140 n.5, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 748 n.5.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident
Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REv. 774 (1971); Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary
Local Zoning Decisions: Restricted Access to State Courts and the Alternative Federal
Forum, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 598 (1971); Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents-
A Response to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND. L. REv.
341 (1971).
153. Cf. "All courts agree that interest groups composed of nonresidents, such as
civil rights organizations, do not have standing" to challenge another municipality's
zoning decisions. Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents-A Response to the Ex-
clusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND. L. REv. 341, 357 (1971).
154. See notes 24 & 87 and accompanying text supra.
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construe it to require of municipalities a truly regional and not merely
an extra-local perspective. However, the assessment of whether Scott
requires a regional perspective depends upon the nature of the par-
ticular land use decision. The Scott court "recognize[d] that local
zoning may have even a regional impact."'15  Since the municipality
must consider the effect of its decision on all affected property, it must
adopt a regional perspective where the effect of a decision will be re-
gion-wide. However, there is an element of subjectivity in determining
whether a particular land use decision does, in fact, have a regional
impact.156 Some courts, in the exclusionary zoning context, have rec-
ognized that local decisions prohibiting housing development do have
a regional impact.15 7 The interests of the region as a whole therefore
are considered in determining the validity of the decision.' 58  The
suggestion in Scott that harmed outsiders may challenge exclusionary
zoning decisions'59 implies that the California Supreme Court might
follow those progressive courts in recognizing the regional impact of
such decisions and assessing their validity accordingly.
A fourth possible extension of Scott is that municipalities now
have standing in certain circumstances to challenge a neighboring mu-
nicipality's decisions. Scott extends protection to all affected property
owners;160 therefore, property owned by another municipal corpora-
tion 81' is deserving of this protection if the property is affected by a
land use decision.
However, Scott has no application in two situations in which one
municipality challenges another's land use decisions. First, if the harm
alleged by the municipality is not linked to a specific parcel of land,
Scott would not apply because there is not an "affected property
owner" involved. Therefore, if a municipality claims that it is forced
by another municipality to bear too much of the regional land use
burden, there is no remedy under the terms of Scott.'62 The protection
155. 6 Cal. 3d at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
156. See text accompanying notes 105-114 supra.
157. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 145-52 supra.
160. 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
161. A municipal corporation has the capacity to acquire and hold property. Hol-
land v. City of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 361 (1857), disapproved on other grounds, Mc-
Cracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591 (1860); cf. Pimental v. City of San Fran-
cisco, 21 Cal. 351 (1863); Williston v. Yuba City, 1 Cal. App. 2d 166, 36 P.2d 445
(1934).
162. Cf. Town of Huntington v. Town Board, 57 Misc. 2d 821, 293 N.Y.S.2d 558
(Sup. Ct. 1968). In that case, Huntington sued to challenge a zoning change permit-
ting a shopping center in Oyster Bay which allegedly would force Huntington to spend
much money to enlarge its roads to accomodate increased traffic created by the devel-
opment. The court denied Huntington's claim, holding that one town has no power
to challenge another city's zoning.
afforded outsiders is limited by the terms of the decision to those ac-
tually owning land.' 63 Second, if the municipality sues in a repre-
sentative capacity on behalf of inhabitants who are individually
harmed by another municipality's action, the Scott decision does not
apply. California courts permit representative suits only if the mu-
nicipality is acting to protect a common right of its citizens.164
Inherent Limitations on Judicial Solutions to
Parochial Land Use Practices
After analyzing several aspects of the potential impact of Scott,
it is necessary to point out that the general problem Scott reflects,
parochial land use decisions, cannot be solved by judicial action
alone. Absent comprehensive legislation, these parochial actions will
continue for three reasons: (1) the institutional fragmentation of land
use planning, (2) the inevitably selfish nature of action taken by mu-
nicipalities, and (3) the impossibility of judicial review of all local
land use decisions.' 6 Even progressive judicial decisions, as exempli-
fied by Scott, confront only the most harmful municipal actions.
Judicial action occurs only in a piecemeal fashion without any
systematic application of a cohesive plan directed at the source of the
problem-institutional fragmentation in the making of land use deci-
sions. 66 Unfortunately, most state legislatures have failed to respond
to the problem of fragmented zoning authority effectively.' 67  In the
absence of effective legislation, other state courts should emulate the
California Supreme Court and actively deter future parochial land use
decisions.
Conclusion
Scott v. City of Indian Wells is a significant land use decision.
Despite the fact that the decision goes well beyond the authority cited
163. 6 Cal. 3d at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal, Rptr. at 750.
164. A municipal corporation has the authority, on behalf of its inhabitants, to
maintain an action preserving the common rights of its citizens, such as the use of
public property. People ex rel. Bryant v. Holladay, 93 Cal. 241, 29 P. 54 (1892), writ
of error dismissed, 159 U.S. 415 (1895).
165. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 504, 521, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965). "This court has become increasingly
aware that it is neither a super board of adjustment nor a planning commission of
last resort."
166. See generally Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land Use Parochialism-Toward
a Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1971); Haar, Regionalism and Realism in
Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1957); Vestal, Government Fragmentation
in Urban Areas, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 155 (1971).
167. See generally Marks & Taber, Prospects for Regional Planning in Califor-
nia, 4 PAC. L.J. 117 (1973); Sussna, Local Zoning is Obsolete, 11 CURRENT MUNICIPAL
PROBLEMS 35 (1970); Comment, Regional Planning and Local Autonomy in Washing-
ton Zoning Law, 45 WASH. L. REV. 593 (1970).
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to support it, this defect does not detract from its vast importance and
potential impact. The court merely concealed the innovative character
of its decision by intimating that its holding accorded with the weight
of authority in other jurisdictions.
Through Scott, the California Supreme Court has stated emphat-
ically that a municipality may no longer make land use decisions that
serve its own interests at the expense of the interests of neighboring
nonresidents. The three significant aspects of the decision merit re-
statement. In making land use decisions, municipalities must now give
as much consideration to the interests of affected property owners
outside their borders as to property owners located within their bor-
ders. 168 In order for nonresidents to assert rights correlative to this
duty, municipalities must give them notice and a hearing before they
can make a decision adversely affecting the nonresidents' property.1
69
Finally, the California judiciary will now begin to oversee this process
because nonresidents have standing to enforce these newly created
rights. 1
70
The significance of this three-pronged protection afforded non-
residents is enhanced by the wide scope of the court's opinion in a
case which could have been decided on much narrower grounds.
While many factors inherent in parochial land use decision-making
prevent the problem from being totally remedied by judicial action,
within these limitations, Scott v. City of Indian Wells is one of the
strongest judicial statements yet directed against harmful municipal pa-
rochialism.
Jeffrey C. Nelson*
168. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
169. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
170. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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